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"THE NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM":
LOOKING BACK*
Ralph K. Winter**
I. "THE NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM"
In 1968, my late colleague and friend, Alexander Bickel, wrote of
"The New Age of Polictical Reform."' Alex favored reform. He
warned that "the institutions of a secular, democratic government
[are] ... mysteries' '2 and that "the sudden abandonment of [such]
institutions. . . reverberates in ways no one can predict."s We do
well, he concluded, to remain attached "to institutions that are
often the products more of accident than of design....,4
At the time Alex wrote, our political system was beset by criti-
cism bordering on denunciation. Some were suggesting that violent
change was the alternative to reform. Proposals for reform en-
gulfed us. Many of those proposals now govern the organization of
our politics. Reapportionment and its accompanying slogan of "one
person, one vote" was then beginning to take hold. The wholesale
"opening up" of our political parties through caucuses and prima-
ries was under consideration, as was abolition of the unit rule at
* This article was originally presented as one in the series of John A. Sibley Lectures
delivered at The University of Georgia School of Law in May 1980. The American
Enterprise Institute will be publishing an expanded version of Professor Winter's article at
some future date.
** William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School, B.A., 1957; L.L.B., 1960;
M.A., 1968, Yale.
A. BicKEL, THE Naw AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM (1968).
Id. at 2.
3 Id. at 3.
4Id.
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national party conventions and a loosening of restrictions on voting
registration and party affiliation. Campaigns for federal office were
to be subjected to a complex regulatory code governing campaign
financing. Other calls for reform failed, thus far, at least. Direct
election has not replaced the electoral college, Congress has not
imposed statutory conditions upon those engaged in lobbying,
voter registration by postcard is not federal law, the direct presi-
dential primary remains a proposal, much of the campaign primary
regulation has been found to violate the first amendment, and pub-
lic financing of congressional political campaigns has failed to pass
the Congress.
When Alex called this age of political reform "new," he meant to
contrast it, of course, with the Progressive Era at the turn of the
century, which gave us women's suffrage, direct election of the
Senate, the party primary, the popular initiative, recall, and refer-
endum. The Progressives demonstrated that reform can be both
necessary and dangerous. History surely hds validated both wo-
men's suffrage and popular election of Senators. But, as Bickel
wrote, "defeat and mockery. . were the partial result of the di-
rect primary, and certainly of the referendum, the initiative, and
the recall, which turned into tools of minority pressure. . . ."5 He
correctly predicted that from the first accomplished reform of the
"new" age, reapportionment, "defeated expectations and unwanted
consequences" would follow.'
To summarize, the impact of the "new" age of political reform
has been wider and deeper than that of the Progressive Era and
has led to "defeated expectations and unwanted consequences"
that would have astonished even so skeptical an observer as Alex
Bickel. It has impacted upon our political parties with a destruc-
tiveness that even now is difficult to comprehend. Political candi-
dacies increasingly rely upon personal organizations and personal
campaign styles. The method of selecting major party presidential
nominees is so silly that much of the primary and caucus season
resembles nothing so much as a television game show. Single issue
movements increasingly affect electoral decisions while self-ap-
pointed and unaccountable issue organizations play a major role in
setting the political agenda. The result, I believe, has been a major
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increase in the volatility and instability of our politics and a de-
crease in the moderation and responsiveness of the political pro-
cess. As a consequence, our capacity for self-government has been
impaired.
The magnitude of the impact has been affected both by a variety
of demographic factors, which have increased the size and power of
the politically active middle and upper-middle class, and by the
development of new technology, which greatly facilitates the prac-
tice of the new politics and has magnified the impact of reform.
II. THE EVOLVED MADISONIAN SYSTEM
The destructiveness of the new age of political reform caninot be
fully appreciated without understanding the philosophy underlying
the system it was intended to change, which I shall call the evolved
Madisonian system. Here I must add the caveat that it is the the-
ory of American constitutionalism of which I speak. That practice
deviates from theory in numerous, important, and oftimes quite
undesirable ways is, of course, true. But the reformers make no
claim to be improving the practice of our democracy within the
confines of Madisonian theory. Rather, they assault the theory
itself.
It should also be understood that by "constitutionalism" I mean
not only the law of the written Constitution, but also the evolved
traditions, practices, and institutions that have served as the
(small "c") constitutional framework of our politics.
Most of this is well-known to you. The scheme of the written
Constitution was one of checks and balances. State governments
were to wield significant power while the federal government was
organized into separate executive, legislative, and judicial
branches.
This scheme, according to Madison, was designed to insure that
"[w]hilst all authority... [is] derived from and dependent on the
society,"'7 protection against such majorities might be afforded ei-
ther by creating a supreme hereditary or self-appointed authority,
a plain risk to minorities and majorities alike, or by breaking "the
society itself ... into so many parts, interests and classes of citi-
zens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
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little danger from interested combinations of the majority."
Madison's defenses against the tyranny of the majority are,
therefore, twofold. First, by lodging legal authority in separate
branches, "[a]mbition [is] ... made to counteract ambition."'
Powerful persons will not lightly exercise their prerogatives at the
behest of others, or, at least, so Madison hoped. Second, each po-
litical branch represents different constituencies and holds differ-
ent terms of office with the result that, in a socially, economically,
and politically diverse nation, each branch generally has a distinct
political outlook. The President, with a four-year term, must win a
majority of electoral votes cast by state delegations under a unit
rule, winner-take-all system. This tends to exaggerate, beyond
their numerical proportion of the voting population, the power of
majorities in the large states. Members of the House of Represent-
atives run every two years in winner-take-all districts within states.
Senators hold six-year terms and are elected at large within states,
each state having equal representation. Congressmen thus re-
present differing local majorities and each house has its distinct
political complexion, while the Presidency reflects a national con-
stituency generally tilted toward majorities in large states.
The franchise, of course, plays an important role in the evolved
Madisonian system. All competent groups must be accorded the
same voting rights accorded other competent groups. I choose this
convoluted formulation because the Madisonian system in no way
depends on universal suffrage or even direct majority selection of
representatives in every political branch. The creation of compet-
ing centers of power representing differing constituencies requires
the development of constitutional institutions and traditions
designed to provide a measure of continuity and to moderate the
demands of member groups. The result was in accord with
Madison's vision, but also, for reasons that he did not foresee, it is
a testament to what Alex Bickel called the "mysteries" of demo-
cratic rule.
The most important constitutional institution (in a small "c"
sense) is, of course, the political party, while the most important
tradition is a competitive two-party system.
For parties, winning elections is the principal goal. A party seek-
'Id.
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ing to play a "spoiler" role may create incentives for major parties
to "tilt" in a particular direction, but it also runs the risk of a com-
plete wipe-out. Where the political party is concerned, there is
generally no substitute for victory. As a consequence, electoral laws
can mightily affect the structure of party competition by the terms
they set for victory.
Under proportional representation, victory is subdivided, as it
were. A political party of any significant strength can offer its ad-
herents a measure of victory in legislative representation of certi-
fied ideological purity. The incentives toward a multiparty system
are thus great.
Under single-member, winner-take-all districts, only the candi-
date with the largest number of votes is elected and victory cannot
be subdivided. The consequence, of course, is the creation of incen-
tives for pre-election coalitions behind two candidates, which,
while they may blur ideological distinctions of importance to some,
offer the chance to be part of a victorious combination. Because
virtually all senators, representatives, governors, and state legisla-
tors are elected by this method, the incentives for those active in
the political process to join one of the two largest parties is consid-
erable, as is the diminishing appeal of third parties. The electoral
college generates similar incentives, for the candidate with the
largest number of votes in a state gets 100% of its electoral votes.
Other little-known electoral laws are important in maintaining
the two-party system. In most states, a person cannot run as the
candidate of more than one political party. Where this is not the
case, the ability to run a major-party candidate on a minor-party
ticket increases the minor party's power because it offers the af-
firmative option of directly supporting major-party nominees in
addition to the negative role of attracting votes away from them. It
also offers minor-party adherents a chance of victory for a party-
endorsed candidate. Where local law allows candidates to run on
more than a single party line, as in New York, permanent minor
parties may appear.
The parties themselves, in the theory of the evolved Madisonian
system, are private groups managed and operated largely by per-
sons active within the organization - party leaders and workers,
as they have come to be called. Nominations are largely within
their control through local caucuses or conventions, at which repre-
sentation is largely restricted to the party establishment. These
1980]
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leaders and workers thus have a personal stake in the party organi-
zation and its electoral success-incentives that insure a working
political organization at the grass roots level. In a two-party sys-
tem, these incentives also tend to insure that party leaders, in or-
der to compete with their adversary, will seek the broadest feasible
coalition. Competition will tend to force them to appeal to any
group that might be attracted and that does not alienate other sig-
nificant groups. They will also have an incentive to select as the
party nominee the candidate perceived to have the best chance of
victory in the general election.
Nominees and successful candidates are necessarily beholden to
the party and those who control it. Quite apart from the fact that
the nomination is a sine qua non, electoral victory may well de-
pend upon the organizational support of party workers and upon
financing provided by the party. The degree to which candidates
are beholden depends, of course, upon the party's contribution to
victory, for the bottom line is still how many votes are cast for the
candidate.
The party's importance in this regard, in turn, depends upon the
formal political acts of platform adoption, campaign promises,
voter registration, and get-out-the vote drives. It also depends
upon the party's relation to a multitude of groups that affect our
politics. The national labor unions, trade associations, and the like,
of course, come to mind. But also to be taken into account are
groups organized for wholly nonpolitical purposes, but which often
affect the political affiliation, outlook, or activities of some or all of
their members. Any place where people regularly gather almost au-
tomatically becomes a locus for potential political activity.
Churches are only the most obvious example. Civic clubs, neigh-
borhood associations, university alumni meetings, garden clubs,
ethnic associations, booster clubs, all kinds of professional organi-
zations, bowling leagues, etc., are all potential loci of activities that
may affect our politics at one level or another. I live in a town, for
example, in which a third party ran a full slate of candidates in a
recent election. The third party was formed as a result of activities
in the little league.
American politics and American political parties thus involve a
massive network of interconnected, overlapping groups, large' and
small, local, regional, and national, organized for economic, spiri-
tual, recreational, professional, social, or educational purposes. The
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relationships are complex, subtle, and perhaps indescribable.
Members of such groups are invited to become party workers while
party workers become members. All serve as channels of communi-
cation between the groups and the party. The overlapping mem-
bership of groups, and of groups and political parties, also gives
party workers contact both with independents and with the oppo-
sition. What is clear, I think, is that parties must bid for the favor
of groups that do not have clear and intensely desired political
goals. The parties need these groups more than the groups need
the parties. Other groups do have intensely felt political goals,
however, and they need the parties as much as the parties need
them. This, I believe, is a mighty force for moderation because
party support for groups with defined political goals may be condi-
tioned upon the groups' tailoring their claims so as not to alienate
less politically concerned persons.
The consequences of this complex process are that competitive
parties in a two-party system will move toward each other as party
leaders seek a coalition that will produce majorities. Candidates
will be people with whom party leaders feel confortable and whom
they believe have the best chance of victory. If the groups within
the particular political unit are highly varied, sharp ideological
stances are likely to be avoided, as are candidates that have at-
tracted the animosity of a particular group, for a party seeking vic-
tory cannot afford to alienate any significant group unless, of
course, that alienation is prized by an even larger group. The coali-
tions thus formed, moreover, are rarely temporary or ad hoc, for a
measure of continuity is valuable to a competitive political party,
just as a brand name provides good will for a manufacturer. A
favorable identification among certain groups greatly reduces a
party's costs in rallying the electorate and provides it a political
base from which it can expand. Were political parties to begin coa-
lition building anew before every election, a tendency toward polit-
ical anarchy and voter confusion would result, as would an increase
in the importance of personality, gimmicks, and demagoguery in
electoral contests. A competitive two-party system mitigates
against this by creating pressures toward broad but relatively sta-
ble coalitions.
The role of third parties in such a system is of considerable im-
portance. If significant groups are excluded from major-party coali-
tions, either because they are outside the mainstream of contempo-
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rary politics or because the major parties respond too slowly to
changes in the public mood, the third-party route offers the possi-
bility of a demonstration of political strength.
Under the evolved Madisonian system, then, political parties
perform several critical overlapping functions, most of which were
unforeseen by Madison. First, they create an organizational frame-
work for our politics. An election without parties would simply be
anarchic. Parties set a political agenda and provide viable candi-
dates in small numbers.
Second, a two-party system provides stability by encouraging
pre-election coalitions that also serve as the nucleus for future co-
alitions. In multiparty systems, coalitions are normally formed for
run-off elections or in the process of forming a parliamentary gov-
ernment. Because the leaders of parties in such a system have a
strong interest in maintaining a separate organizational identity,
and because the raison d'etre for some of the parties will be to
press without compromise particularized ideological claims, coali-
tions in multiparty systems will tend to be ad hoc, unstable, and
frequently hostage to the extreme claims of small groups.
Third, the two-party system accomplishes in large part what
Madison foresaw as the consequence of pluralism, namely, a mea-
sure of protection for political minorities. As Richard Hofstadter
has noted, what Madison hoped to achieve through pluralism
among many factions has been achieved through pluralism within
two parties. The protection afforded minority interests comes, of
course, from the moderation produced by coalitions formed by the
major parties. Because the aim of those putting the coalition to-
gether is electoral victory, groups hoping to share in that victory
must moderate their more extreme demands so that contribution is
not offset by losses among other groups.
Fourth, the coalitions formed by the parties provide a mecha-
nism to govern in the periods between elections. Office holders owe
their position in some measure to a state or national party, and the
process of governing is a quite natural extension of pre-election co-
alition building. The continual formation, disintegration, and ref-
ormation of coalitions during interim periods, which occurs so
often in multiparty parliamentary systems, is avoided. What does
occur is that the separation of powers between branches, with each
branch elected by a distinctive constituency, necessarily reduces,
but does not eliminate, the role of party in governing, as the Re-
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publican-Southern Democratic congressional coalition demon-
strates. One should not overestimate the lack of national-party in-
fluence, however, since responsiveness to particular state parties
does not necessarily lead to responsiveness to the national coalition
that elects the President.
Fifth, viewed in an overall perspective, the parties perform a
crucial democratizing function. Democracy requires votes, but
votes do not necessarily lead to democratic rule. In most elections
or referenda, voters are not permitted to express the full range of
their opinions. A referendum proposition is voted up or down while
hundreds of reasonable intermediate positions are ignored. In leg-
islative bodies, it is well known that the order in which proposals
are voted upon is as determinative of the outcome as any other
factor. And in elections, voters can register only their first choice
among the candidates offered, their second and third choices being
unknown, whether they are on the ballot or not. Nor do votes mea-
sure the intensity of feeling, a factor important to generating con-
sent within the system. In nominating candidates and in setting
the political agenda, parties perform the critical function of mea-
suring and acting in politically meaningful ways upon second,
third, and fourth choices, as well as intensities of feelings. This is
not done with mathematical precision. Indeed, it cannot be, and
for that reason an institution like a political party is necessary to
insure that the most cogent choices, in terms of the full range of
public opinion, are offered in elections.
That, then, is the evolved Madisonian system. It is, of course, an
idealized version, but nothing so excites the professorial mind as
the quest for ever more accurate descriptions of things that do not
exist.
In practice, the American political system has contained many of
the elements of the evolved Madisonian system. In some regions,
the two have come very close in practice. In others, any resem-
blance has been difficult to discern.
I need not describe in any detail the deliberate destruction of a
competitive party system in the South through the use of the pri-
mary, which prevented losing candidates from running in the gen-
eral election, the disfranchisement of blacks so that no political
group would be tempted to look to them for coalition building pur-
poses, the disfranchisement through a variety of devices of many
whites who did not belong to the dominant faction of the Demo-
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cratic Party, and the use of malapportionment to preserve the in-
cumbency of that faction. The result was an unstructured politics,
heavily concentrated on individual candidates, prone to extremism
and demagoguery.
The failure, I would argue, was not a failure of the evolved
Madisonian system but rather a failure to use it. No matter, how-
ever, for the advent of the new age of political reform signaled
not the further evolution of the Madisonian system, but its
destruction.
III. THE REFORM MOVEMENT AND ITS ALLIES
The reformers who assaulted the Madisonian system have roots
in American history and in American political rhetoric. They were
the leaders of the Progressive Movement and their language is in
the language of high school civics classes.
To them the citizen is a person of good will who decides political
questions on the merits alone, and only after study and delibera-
tion. Whereas Madison extolled pluralism and the conflict between
competing groups, a leading reform organization calls itself "Com-
mon Cause." To reformers, the Madisonian system is little more
than an intricate set of rules and institutions designed to put im-
pediments in the citizen's quest of good government. Because the
parties are more interested in winning than in debating issues, the
public is not adequately informed, and issue-oriented candidates
are cast aside for those who survive by never taking stands on pub-
lic questions. Thus, it is believed that: campaigns rely too heavily
upon media advertising and not enough on "real" discussions of
the issues; because parties are "boss run," the rank and file of a
party has little to say about the nominees of that party, a case of
minority rule; and, the minorities that rule the parties are usually
selfish economic interests hoping to live off a public that is power-
less to drive them from our politics.
Because giving direct power to the citizen is a centerpiece of
such a movement, the menu of reforms is aimed in part at the de-
struction of the power of intermediary groups such as party organi-
zations or special interest groups.
For the most part, these reforms are described as increasing the
majoritarian aspects of our political process. One ought not as-
sume, however, that majoritarianism is the linchpin of the move-
ment. The reformers are also part of a more general political move-
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ment with goals and interests of its own, which may outweigh
majoritarian values. For example, those who press most urgently
for political reform also generally mistrust the voter's ability to
resist campaign advertising, and favor limitations on campaign
expenditures. The reformers tend to be well-educated, middle or
upper-middle class individuals who are political activists. They be-
long to or support a variety of issue organizations that press causes
such as the consumerist or environmentalist movements. One
ought to expect their menu of reforms to favor measures that in-
crease the power of political activists and issue organizations. One
ought also to expect that other groups will benefit from reform.
Reform groups need allies to pass legislation, including the much-
maligned special interests, and those allies can be expected to pro-
tect themselves. Reform of campaign financing, for example, has
always had organized labor's support. Moreover, the impact of po-
litical reform is not easily predicted. Many, for example, have been
surprised by the fact that the campaign finance laws have been a
boon to the New Right.
This age of political reform had differed from the Progressive
Era in that its agenda is more pervasive and its accomplishments
more permanent. This is so for two reasons. First, the increase in
numbers of college-educated persons has meant an increase in the
pool of recruits for reform groups. Education almost always dimin-
ishes the individual's need for intermediary organizations, in-
creases political awareness, and creates disdain for fuzziness in po-
litical outlook. University faculties, moreover, frequently have an
outlook similar to that of the reformers, and that outlook is trans-
ferred to students.
Second, technological developments such as televisions and com-
puters and the increasing sophistication of polling techniques have
operated in conjunction with political reform to revolutionize polit-
ical method.
IV. THE REFORMED POLITICAL SYSTEM
The combined effect of the new political reform and the new
technology has been drastic. While reapportionment undoubtedly
has had many quite beneficial effects, it is also a source of system-
atic gerrymandering that allows post-census legistators to rule by
dead hand for a decade.
More critically, the competitive two-party system has been seri-
1980]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
ously, perhaps fatally, impaired by "party reform." The influence
of party leaders upon the nomination process has been weakened,
and the activities of party workers as intermediaries between the
public and the party have declined. Party nominees are increas-
ingly chosen by a process that bypasses the party organization and
that decidedly does not entail a professional judgment as to which
candidate is most likely to win in a competitive general election.
Party nominating mechanisms have been opened to persons whose
vote in party caucuses or primaries is their sole act as a party ad-
herent. In New Haven, Yale students lined up to register as
Republicans last spring. Many explained in acute embarrassment
to the registrar that only by so debasing themselves could they
vote for Congressman Anderson. In other states, even that act is
unnecessary to vote in a party primary.
The decline of party influence is also partly due to campaign
laws that both limit what parties can raise and spend on behalf of
candidates and force candidates to centralize their campaign activ-
ities under a separate candidate-operated committee. Candidates
necessarily view themselves as independent from the party. The
weakening process feeds on itself. Party workers let up or even dis-
appear as they feel a diminishing of their influence. Candidates see
the party withering away and rely even less upon it.
As the role of parties has declined, the role of individual candi-
dates has increased enormously. Indeed, the nation has turned
more to the model of the one-party South than the other way
around. Technology has made this possible by enabling candidates
to appeal directly to the public through television and computer-
ized mailing lists, while sophisticated polling techniques allow can-
didates to gather information about the public mood while bypas-
sing the party. But a mighty push in this direction came both from
opening up the nominating process and from campaign finance
laws, which give enormous advantages to candidates with indepen-
dent fund-raising capabilities. Senator Helms, for example, report-
edly has a fund-raising organization that makes him virtually inde-
pendent of the Republican party. The Federal Election Campaign
Act, moreover, has institutionalized a process by which ideological
groups such as NCPAC, and other interests such as unions or cor-
porations, bypass the party and give help directly to candidates.
Candidates must increasingly view the party organization as
irrelevant.
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Although the reforms were designed to showcase issues, the re-
sult has been emphasized personality. Nothing demonstrates this
more than talk of a serious "independent candidacy"-notice that
the term "third party" is rarely used-by Congressman Anderson.
Not long ago he was at best slightly better than unknown. Now he
commands something of a national constituency. He does not re-
present a movement in the traditional sense. His political positions
have not been particularly stable over time and, while he is now
mildly liberal, he can hardly be said to represent views that are not
found elsewhere. Indeed, according to one poll, Wisconsin voters
who cast their ballots for Anderson had as their second choice
President Carter.
This rise in personality is matched by a decline in rationality
and structure in our politics. In a rational system, the pool of seri-
ous presidential candidates would be comprised almost exclusively
of persons holding high political office. In our present system, it
appears to be almost a detriment to hold any office other than the
Presidency itself. Many advantages, in fact, accrue to candidates
who do not work. Without debating the presidential qualities of
either gentleman, it can fairly be said that Jimmy Carter and
George Bush at the time of their announcements seemed about as
likely presidential material as perhaps fifty other members of their
respective parties, while Governor Reagan's absence from public
office for the past six years would in most political systems be a
handicap. We have constructed a presidential nominating system
that allows a virtual unknown to shine like a supernova in our po-
litical universe on the basis of a single caucus or primary while
years of experience in national politics produce barely a twinkle.
In truth, the process is so dependent on the media that it has
almost become a television game show. The contestants, some of
whom are invited celebrities while others are virtually chosen from
the audience, seek the attention of the master of ceremo-
nies-TV-who decides what the questions are and which contest-
ant is leading, subject to being overruled by the audience, which, of
course, is given hints as to when to spring a surprise. Poor old
Bush correctly perceived that the early issue for the media was
"momentum," but was startled when television began to report
that he was talking about that instead of the issues. Senator Ken-
nedy's inarticulate style was a big media issue for a while-even to
the point of one network emphasizing the startling news that he
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delivered his Georgetown speech from a teleprompter. Had we had
television in 1863, the big news from Gettysburg would have been
that the President could not deliver even a very short speech ex-
temporaneously, but had to read it from the back of an envelope.
Other candidates were luckier. Congressman Anderson was treated
by the networks as a serious contender for the Republican nomina-
tion for coming in second in two primaries-he never came in
first-although he was not on the ballot in the South or even in
large northern states such as New York and Pennsylvania. At the
time of his most concentrated media coverage, a New York Times
Poll showed him to be favored by five percent of Republicans.
It is not television but the nominating system which is at fault.
Television is a business and dull news doesn't sell. Moreover, a
politics of personalities lends itself to volatility and to hype. Under
the older system, party caucuses were not open to anyone who
chose to attend. The primaries were limited in number and were
largely a testing ground for party professionals to judge a candi-
date's potential for national appeal. The choice made was an in-
formed one, made by professionals after deliberation. What has re-
placed it is a complex of irrationalities in which all kinds of
irrelevant factors play a role. Moreover, decisive steps are taken at
far too early a stage. Both the primary laws and the difficulty in
raising money under the campaign finance laws make it virtually
impossible for a candidate to enter the contest after January 1 of
the election year. Even Gerald Ford's political base was not enough
to allow him to become a viable candidate as early as March of this
year. In the Democratic party, moreover, the absence of the unit
rule makes it difficult to adjust to events. President Carter's early
lead in the wake of the Iranian and Afghan crises clinched the
nomination although his public standing sharply deteriorated well
before the convention in New York. Or it may incite a crisis in
which democratically elected delegates attempt to ignore their
pledges to vote.
Our politics are also exhibiting an increasing lack of moderation.
One hears constant concern over the rise of single-issue groups
pressing their claims upon candidates. What else would one expect,
however, from a system that subjects strategic points in the politi-
cal process to direct control by small numbers of issue activists?
The campaign finance laws, the open nominating process, and the
lack of party organization encourage, not to say force, candidates
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to attend to the wants of small cohesive groups. In New York, for
example, the fourth largest party is the Right to Life party, which
now attracts more votes than the Liberal party. Moreover, the de-
ceased Mr. Jim Jones, lately of Guyana, had a drawerful of lauda-
tory mail from prominent Democrats who could not afford to ig-
nore a group of that size in California. A working two-party system
would either ignore such groups or force them to moderate their
more extreme claims. An "open" system allows them to go directly
to candidates and press for all they can get.
Issue organizations based in Washington also have taken over
much of the role of parties in setting the political agenda. These
groups have proliferated in recent years, partly as a consequence of
the vacuum created by the decline of parties, and partly because
television coverage of their news conferences and congressional tes-
timony, as well as direct mail techniques, allow them to operate as
independent political forces. I am less sanguine than many about
their effect on our politics. The people who run them have a strong
incentive to press their particular issues without regard to compet-
ing values and to exploit raw emotion. Cries for product safety reg-
ulation rarely spare gory details, while opposition to the Panama
Canal Treaty did not lack the prediction of dire consequences.
Their dependence on the media and direct mail forces them to
capsulize their message in true Madison Avenue fashion rather
than to contribute to a sophisticated discussion of the issues. Issue
organizations, too, engage in coalition politics, but on an ad hoc
basis and with individual office holders. Moreover, these organiza-
tions are run in a far less democratic fashion than our parties ever
were-so far as one can tell, they are accountable to no one but the
media. Some of the more famous ones, moreover, which are said to
raise very substantial funds, reveal neither the sources of their
financing nor how they use that money. I expect that these groups
will, over time, further diminish the moderating forces in the polit-
ical process.
The reformed political process is, I believe, less democratic than
the Madisonian system. Earlier, I mentioned that a critical func-
tion of parties was to register second and third choices. The re-
forms have simply eliminated that function. Consider an early pri-
mary in which six candidates run. Candidate A, let us say, has an
enthusiastic following of ideologues but no other support. B has a
gimmick that is sufficiently novel to attract a similarly sized group.
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C and D are established political figures who are more moderate in
position and more traditional in campaign method. E and F are
also political figures, less well-known nationally, but with some
support in this state. The outcome is A with 27%, B with 26%, C
and D 15% each, while E and F get 81/2 % each. Assume further,
and this is not implausible, that C and D are fully acceptable and
virtually everyone's second and third choice, while A is unaccept-
able to a large group, B's support is transitory, and E and F attract
general indifference.
In those circumstances, either C or D ought to be the eventual
nominee. Under the present system, however, all the media atten-
tion, and much of the political money, go to A and B, who, if they
can repeat their performance in one more primary, say in a week,
will eliminate C and D. Under the old system, the bosses correctly
would have discounted A and B's long-run strength. It is no acci-
dent that people keep complaining about the sorry alternatives in
general elections.
So too, the influence of issue organizations on the political pro-
cess between elections poses questions in much the same fashion as
do referenda. Intermediate positions tend to get lost as choices be-
tween extremes are emphasized.
In truth, the great mass of our citizens, who depend upon the
parties to serve as intermediaries, now have less power than ever.
The destruction of the parties, the opening up of the process to
control at strategic points by small groups, and the technicalities
of the campaign finance laws have vastly increased the power of
small groups and, yes, special interests.
Our capacity to govern has been deeply affected. Members of
Congress, who run more as individuals than as members of a party,
are even more inclined not to follow the lead of the White House,
particularly when they are able to vote themselves perquisites,
such as staff, offices, and free mailing privileges, which can be used
as valuable campaign tools. A president who comes to office after a
personal campaign that was not reliant on a party-structured coali-
tion may come to office without a realistic agenda of issues. My
colleague at Yale, Chris Arterton, has observed that Mr. Carter's
statement (overstatement, in fact) that he was beholden to no
group may well explain some of the confusion over what the real
policies of his administration are.
[Vol. 15:1
POLITICAL REFORM
V. WHITHER THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Alex Bickel was surely right when he warned us against sudden
structural change and advised us that the accident of history may
serve us better than the hand of conscious change.
The new politics gives encouragement to all kinds of oddities
and demagogues to seek national power and the Presidency itself.
In the 1950's it was the party system which ultimately crushed Joe
McCarthy, because, however intensely his followers may have be-
lieved in him, a party organization could not accommodate such
extremism within a coalition intended to appeal to the great mass
of our citizenry. When he failed to moderate his conduct, the party
itself was challenged and he was destroyed, even while his private
constituency continued to support him. I quite frankly think that
no such countervailing power exists today. McCarthy would have
been a super fundralser under the campaign finance laws and
probably could have made a serious run at the Presidency. I do not
doubt that he would have won every primary in which he faced
more than one opponent. Failing to get nominated, he might well
have been an effective third party candidate.
My pessimism is the result not only of this appraisal of where we
stand, but also of my apprehension that the forces favoring the
status quo are far more powerful than those who would return to
the Madisonian system. Some of the reforms, such as those in
campaign financing, favor the only people who can change them,
namely, incumbents. Moreover, the restraints imposed by party or-
ganizations may well be distasteful to many office holders who pre-
fer freedom of action. Many incumbents also gained their offices
because their personality and political skills are well-suited to the
new politics. Finally, the large issue organizations have a stake in
their own power and thus necessarily regard party organizations as
rivals.
Indeed, the changes in the political process that are more seri-
ously pressed today would move us in exactly the wrong direction.
Elimination of the electoral college would further damage, if not
destroy, the two party system. Nationwide primaries would further
weaken party organizations and increase the volatility of our
politics.
If anything, the political establishment today is ranged against
the party system. Consider the proposals for public financing of
congressional campaigns. A bill known as the Common Cause Bill
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was enthusiastically endorsed by the President, who urged its early
passage. It was given the number H.R.1 by the House leadership.
It provides that any candidate eligible for the ballot under state
law is to receive federal campaign financing as soon as he or she
raises their first $1,000. Such legislation necessarily would en-
courage anyone who could not receive a major party nomination to
run as an independent or third party candidate. In fact, because
one can become eligible for the ballot in many places by petition
while major party candidates must be nominated in a primary, in-
dependent candidates might receive federal financing considerably
in advance of the party nominees.
What must be done, I think, is to return to local party organiza-
tions the power to determine the processes by which they select
candidates and delegates to national conventions and to amend the
FECA to make it easier to raise campaign money. Much of our
present trouble came about when national rules governing the se-
lection of delegates were adopted at the Democratic National Con-
vention. State laws then followed which often affected the selection
of nominees for other offices and the Republican Party as well. Na-
tional rules are a mistake because they are frequently designed to
do little more than to enhance the power of a particular faction at
the next convention or to serve other transitory needs. Local par-
ties must be strengthened if we are to have parties at all. We are
too large and too diverse a nation to build parties from the top
down.
What is at stake is nothing less than democratic government. If
it fails here, it will fall everywhere. If it succeeds here, it has a
future. We have in recent years shown little deference to our politi-
cal traditions and institutions. Instead of recognizing that 200
years of even imperfect democracy marked by progress toward
more civilized rule is a remarkable human achievement, we have
adopted an attitude of unrestrained self-criticism that treats our
society and our political system in a frivolous and petulant man-
ner. History has harsh rewards for those who cannot acknowledge
progress and who would carelessly abandon the hard-won gains of
the past for the ephemeral promises of the unknown. I fear that we
have hardly begun to pay the price.
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